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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY OF LAW

PATCHWORK METROPOLIS: FRAGMENTED GOVERNANCE AND
URBAN DECLINE IN GREATER ST. LOUIS

COLIN GORDON*
In the early 1960s, in the wake of yet another failure to stitch St. Louis
County (the “County”) and St. Louis City (the “City”) back together again,
regional planners returned to their drafting tables. The task, given their
inability to overcome the parochial defense of “home rule” in St. Louis County
(already a crazy quilt of eighty-six incorporated municipalities), was to redraw
the region’s boundaries in such a way as to preserve the apparent virtues of
local governance while overcoming the destructive fragmentation that came
with it.1 As a planning exercise, this task had two overarching goals. The first
was to breach the boundary between the City and the County—a line which
postwar planners characterized as a “Berlin Wall” between a declining city and
its affluent suburbs, and which fair housing advocates described as a “steel
ring” or “white noose” of segregation.2 The second was to even out the scale
and responsibility of the region’s municipalities—which ranged from the City
of St. Louis, with a 1960 population of 750,000, to the St. Louis County suburb
of Champ, incorporated in 1959 with a population of 14.3

* Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies, University of Iowa.
1. F. William Human, Jr., The Borough Plan – An Opposition View, 9 ST. LOUIS BAR J. 19,
22–23, 25 (1962); E. TERRENCE JONES, FRAGMENTED BY DESIGN: WHY ST. LOUIS HAS SO
MANY GOVERNMENTS 79–82 (2000); St. Louis League of Women Voters, Some Facts about the
Borough Plan that the Sponsors Do Not Want to Mention Publicly (Apr. 4, 1962) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the St. Louis League of Women Voters Records, folder 1163 (sl530),
the Western Historical Manuscript Collection at the University of Missouri–St. Louis).
2. See WILLIAM KOTTMEYER, ST. LOUIS BD. OF EDUC., A TALE OF TWO CITIES (1968),
excerpted in DANIEL SCHAFLY, 28 YEARS ON THE ST. LOUIS SCHOOL BOARD (1995) (“Berlin
Wall” analogue); Patricia Jansen Doyle, St. Louis: City with the Blues, SATURDAY REV., Feb. 15,
1969, at 90; Appellant’s Abstract of the Record at 9, Dolan v. Richardson, 181 S.W.2d 997 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1944) (No. 26,502) (“ring of steel”); HUMAN DEV. CORP. OF ST. LOUIS, RESEARCH
DEP’T, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POVERTY: ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN AREA: CAUSES,
CONDITIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 (1971) (“white noose”).
3. Harland Bartholomew and Associates, City Planners, A Report upon Development and
Administration of the Village of Champ, Missouri 4–5 (May, 1962) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file in the Harland Bartholomew Papers, vol. 15, ser. 2 (Blue) at Washington University); see also
Laura Higgins, The Champ, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Feb. 14, 2001, http://www.riverfronttimes.com/
content/printVersion/110097/.
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One of the early sketches in this exercise, however fanciful and infeasible,
neatly captured the logic and challenge of local governance. It redrew the
municipal boundaries on the Missouri side as a series of wedges—their points
anchored on the riverfront, their boundaries widening as they moved west
across the City, the City-County border, and out to the western edge of St.
Louis County.4 Each municipality in this division of the region’s population,
assets, and burdens would include a small portion of the deindustrializing
riverfront and the City’s older commercial core, a slice of older residential
stock in the central and western reaches of the City, a small band of inner
suburbs (much of which more closely resembled the City in its land use and
demographics), a stretch of newer suburban development, and a frontier of
lightly developed property at its western edge.
The genius of the proposal, of course, was this: it gave a cursory nod to the
desire for local governance and home rule, but then forced each of the new
municipal units to think like a region. It made it impossible for municipal
fragments to practice the art, as Myron Orfield puts it, “of skimming the cream
from metropolitan growth while accepting as few metropolitan responsibilities
as possible.”5 Each of you, it suggested, have some rich residents and some
poor residents, some property whose tax value is increasing and some property
whose value is languishing, some pockets of commercial growth and some
pockets of blight and unemployment, and some prospects for new development
and some pressing demands for redevelopment. How would you zone such a
municipality? How would you pay for its schools and other public goods and
services? How would you approach the challenges of transportation or
economic development?
I. THE DIVORCE: 1876 AND ALL THAT
The initial separation of St. Louis City and St. Louis County anticipated
none of this. In the wake of the Civil War, St. Louis interests were weary of
both laundering the most mundane details of local government through
Jefferson City6 and paying for the privilege of duplicative County services.7 At
its 1876 constitutional convention, Missouri formalized its rules for local
governance—setting local debt limits, proscribing the passage of “special
4. Don Phares, Planning for Regional Governance in the St. Louis Area: The Contexts, the
Plans, the Outcomes, in ST. LOUIS PLANS: THE IDEAL AND THE REAL ST. LOUIS 55, 66–67 (Mark
Tranel ed., 2007).
5. MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND
STABILITY 5–6 (1998).
6. Before home rule, every new tax, levy, or sewer line was an act of the state legislature.
Truman Port Young, The Scheme of City and County Governments in St. Louis – Its History and
Purposes, 6 PROC. AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 97, 98 (1912).
7. Id. at 98–99.
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laws” in the statehouse, establishing a classification system for villages, towns,
and cities, and giving cities over a certain population threshold (initially set so
as just to include St. Louis) the option of adopting a charter of selfgovernment.8 In response, St. Louis City pushed its boundaries west, to their
current location, and opted for formal separation from St. Louis County.9
Because the City was no longer located in a county, the new charter, in effect,
made it its own county. This resulted in a hybrid government with both
municipal (e.g., police power) and county (e.g., property assessment and
courts) responsibilities.10
At the time, separation from the County made sense for City interests, and
details of the 1876 agreement were crafted and implemented largely at their
behest.11 But over the ensuing decades, three things happened to alter the terms
of this deal. First, the metropolitan area grew and soon pressed against the
western border established in 1876.12 In order to sustain the City as a natural
unit of government, its reach coterminous with that of its population and its
economic base, the logical step was to add new territory by annexation. But
this option was blocked by the hard line drawn between St. Louis City and St.
Louis County in 1876, and by the state boundary between the City and its
industrial suburbs in the Illinois side of the Mississippi.13 As a result, urban
growth continued, but beyond the regulatory reach of the City.14 Second, the
right of self-government that had been extended to St. Louis alone in 1876 was
soon made available to almost all comers.15 By 1945 home rule had become an
option for any Missouri city with over 5,000 residents and any county with
assessed property value exceeding $4.5 million.16 And third, the African
8. JONES, supra note 1, at 3–9; Young, supra note 6, at 100; U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A-127, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY: NEEDS FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND JUDICIAL CLARIFICATION 41 (1993).
9. Young, supra note 6, at 101.
10. E. Terrence Jones & Don Phares, Missouri, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE
HANDBOOK 241, 241–43 (2001); St. Louis League of Women Voters, Structure of Government in
St. Louis, Missouri (May 4, 1953) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the St. Louis League of
Women Voters Records (sl234) box 18:98 in the Western Historical Manuscript Collection at the
University of Missouri–St. Louis).
11. Young, supra note 6, at 103.
12. City Plan Comm’n, St. Louis, Missouri, Subdivision of Land in St. Louis by Decades,
Jan. 1967, http://library.wustl.edu/vlib/mrdc/composite.html. For the pace of development within
the 1876 boundaries, see the Wayman Map, which map documents each subdivision, addition,
and re-subdivision of property made in the City of St. Louis after 1816).
13. JONES, supra note 1, at 2–3.
14. See COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. LOUIS AND THE FATE OF THE AMERICAN
CITY 129 (Glenda Gilmore et al. eds., 2008).
15. Henry J. Schmandt, Municipal Home Rule in Missouri, 1953 WASH. U. L.Q. 385, 385
(1953).
16. MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19.
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American population of St. Louis grew rapidly, more than doubling from 1890
to 1920 and more than doubling again from 1920 to 1950.17
What all of this meant, in effect, was that the temporary advantage
afforded to the City of St. Louis in 1876 soon became a grotesque liability.
Natural urban growth, changing state law, and changing demographics
combined to give surrounding communities, especially those multiplying west
of the city limits, both the opportunity and the incentive to poach St. Louis of
its wealth and resources.18 Because the City could not expand, new residential
development to the west fell under other jurisdictions, or created their own.19
The central planning goal of these private developments and new
municipalities, in turn, was to insulate themselves from local costs or threats or
burdens—especially industrial land use, multifamily housing, and African
American occupancy.20 The damage here was done not by the divorce of 1876,
but by the offspring of that divorce: the extension of home rule to a hundredodd municipal fragments that were—in purpose and in practice—predatory,
insular, and deeply discriminatory.21
II. THE EMANCIPATED CITY? MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
This is an uncomfortably dismal assessment. An abiding faith in home
rule, after all, is deeply rooted in American political theory and experience,
running virtually unbroken from de Tocqueville22 to the devolutionary politics
of recent years, and across the political spectrum from the New Left's
participatory ideals to the New Right's antistatist focus on community and
family.23 “Local government comes closer to the people than any other,” as
one municipal reformer argued in the early twentieth century.
It is basic. It is through its exercise that men acquire their political schooling
24
and become familiar with what democratic institutions mean.

17. In 1920, the African American population of St. Louis was about 70,000, or 10% of the
City’s total population; in 1950 it was over 150,000, almost 20% of the City’s population. Bureau
of Census, county totals via the Historical Census Browser. Retrieved May 24, 2014, from the
University of Virginia, Geospatial and Statistical Data Center: http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/
collections/stats/histcensus/index.html.
18. See GORDON, supra note 14, at 129–131.
19. See id. at 39–41.
20. See id. at 3–38.
21. See GORDON, supra note 14, at 45–46.
22. ALEXANDER DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 62 (Phillips Bradley &
Vintage Books eds., 1945) (“The village or township is the only association which is so perfectly
natural that, wherever a number of men are collected, it seems to constitute itself.”).
23. WILLIAM HUFF, THE TEA PARTY MANIFESTO 954 (2010).
24. WALTER TALLMADGE ARNDT, THE EMANCIPATION OF THE AMERICAN CITY 16 (1917).
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In the American setting, the politics of home rule have revolved around a
particular legal and historical problem: the task of governing cities.25 The issue
arose first in the late nineteenth century, as rapid urbanization outstripped the
willingness and ability of state legislatures to meet or manage municipal
demands.26 And it reemerged in the context of both the “urban crises” of the
1960s and 1970s and the subsequent devolution of federal responsibilities.27 In
each era, the call for home rule was animated by the simultaneously
philosophical and practical convictions that state legislatures were at best
indifferent and at worst hostile to urban concerns, that urban citizens were
underrepresented and overtaxed, and that cities lacked the authority or
resources to solve their own problems.28 Effective home rule, as urban
reformers have argued now for well over a century, is the key to both
managerial efficiency and civic participation in the modern metropolis.29
Yet there is something troubling in this picture. In most settings, the
victory of home rule was followed not by a golden age of local democracy but
by a precipitous collapse in civic participation, especially voting in local
elections.30 There is little evidence that states with strong home rule provisions
boast better urban governance, and indeed most that fit that description have
devoted a great deal of attention to mopping up after abuses of local
autonomy.31 And, despite decades of experience with home rule, most
American cities remain plagued by a seemingly “iron law” of urban decay.
Rising incomes breed suburbanization.32 Suburbanization robs inner cities of
their tax base.33 Inner city concentrations of poverty widen gaps between urban
residents and substantive economic opportunities, and between suburban

25. Kenneth Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 268, 268–73 (1968).
26. HORACE DEMING, THE GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN CITIES 26–33 (1909).
27. Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J. L. & POL. 1, 26
(2006).
28. See DEMING, supra note 26, at 26–27.
29. The most elaborate, and in many respects romantic, statement of this position is Gerald
Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1119–20 (1980).
30. See Samuel Hays, The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive
Era, 55 PAC. NW. Q. 157, 163 (1964).
31. Such state measures include limits on local debt or tax levies, mandatory audits of local
accounts, and “open-bidding” guidelines. See Lyle Schaller, Home Rule—A Critical Appraisal,
76 POL. SCI. Q. 402, 413 (1961).
32. DANIEL LURIA & JOEL ROGERS, METRO FUTURES: ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS FOR CITIES
AND THEIR SUBURBS 3 (1999).
33. Id.
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residents and urban concerns.34 All of this encourages more flight, not only
from the metropolitan core, but from decaying inner suburbs as well.35
Why is home rule not all it is cracked up to be? The answer lies partly in
the history of the home rule movement. The Progressive Era campaign for
home rule was deeply compromised by the divergent motives of reformers,
determined to wrestle control of the city, in equal part, from indifferent state
legislatures and from working-class political organizations.36 And the answer
lies partly in the history of the modern American city. Patterns of urban growth
and decay have meant that home rule is less a weapon wielded by cities against
other levels of government than it is a weapon wielded by some fractions of
the modern city (especially incorporated suburbs) against both central cities
and broader metropolitan interests.37
Urbanization in the latter half of the nineteenth century posed a practical
and legal riddle. The Constitution—animated in equal parts by distrust of
central authority, anxieties about mob rule, and the conflation of agrarian
property and citizenship—vested “original sovereignty” in the states and
remained silent on the political status of cities.38 The political autonomy of the
emerging American city was determined less by Jeffersonian ideals of selfgovernment or free association than by Madisonian fears of political faction or
fragmentation.39 By law and practice, the city was a quasi-public corporation,
subject to regulation by the state but without “state” powers itself.40 “Localities
could hardly call their souls their own,” as one champion of home rule wrote,
“so tight were the fetters that bound them.”41
These fetters were expressed most clearly by John Dillon, an Iowa
Supreme Court justice and authority on municipal law. “Dillon’s Rule” was
first expressed in the 1868 decision Clinton v. Cedar Rapids42 and enshrined in

34. Id.
35. See id. at 3-4; ORFIELD, supra note 5, at 8–9.
36. Hays, supra note 30, at 166; JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE
LIBERAL STATE: 1900–1918, at 92–116 (1968).
37. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 12 (1985).
38. Cynthia Cumfer, Original Intent v. Modern Judicial Philosophy: Oregon’s Home Rule
Case Frames the Dilemma for State Constitutionalism, 76 OR. L. REV. 909, 912–13 (1997).
39. For doubts about the practicality or propriety of local government, see JOHN STUART
MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 317–340 (The Floating Press
2009).
40. See Cumfer, supra note 38 (describing the legal status of the nineteenth century city);
Frug, supra note 29, at 1098.
41. RODNEY MOTT, HOME RULE FOR AMERICA’S CITIES 11 (1949).
42. Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 474–80 (1868).
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the justice’s 1872 publication, Treatise on the Law of Municipal
Corporations,43 which held that
a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and
not others: First, those powers granted in express words; second, those
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted;
third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared object and
purposes of the corporation, not simply convenient but indispensable. Any fair,
reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by
44
the courts against the corporation and the power is denied.

Cities, quite simply, had few substantive powers of self-government. They
could not levy taxes, go into debt, pursue local improvements, change the
structure of local government, or (in many cases) even hire and pay their own
staff without the express consent of state legislatures.45
As cities and the demands of governing them grew, Dillon’s Rule
frustrated municipal officials and state legislators alike.46 Through the Gilded
Age, by reformers’ estimates, between one-third and one-half of a state
legislature’s attention was devoted to bills of a purely local character and
impact.47 Cities and their citizens had to run to the state for even the most
trivial concerns, and state legislatures spent much of each session acting as
“spasmodic city councils.”48 Even as more recently drafted state constitutions
(particularly in the Midwest) barred such “special legislation,” municipal
management often masqueraded as “general” laws.49 In 1868, for example, the
Ohio legislature adopted the following law, mentioning no city by name but
transparently aimed at just one—Cincinnati:
The City Council of any city of the first class having a population exceeding
150,000 shall have the power to issue the bonds of such city in any sum not
exceeding $150,000, to be used for the purpose of completing the Eggleston
50
Avenue sewer.

43. JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 116 (1872).
44. William Casella, A Century of Home Rule, 64 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 441, 441–42 (1975).
45. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I – The Structure of Local Government Law,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990); DALE KRANE, PLATON RIGOS & MELVIN HILL, HOME RULE IN
AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 9–10 (2001); ARNDT, supra note 24, at 240–259; FRANK
J. GOODNOW, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATION 50–51 (1895).
46. See Cumfer, supra note 38; Frug, supra note 29, at 1116; KRANE, RIGOS & HILL, supra
note 45.
47. ARNDT, supra note 24, at 240–59; GOODNOW, supra note 45, at 50–51.
48. MOTT, supra note 41, at 11.
49. Briffault, supra note 45, at 9; Casella, supra note 44.
50. GOODNOW, supra note 45, at 16; MOTT, supra note 41, at 6–7, 11; Schaller, supra note
31, at 403.
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The problem with such laws was not just their awkwardness but the conviction,
widely held by urban politicos and political reformers alike, that they were
aggressive acts of interference by anti-urban state legislatures. Notorious
episodes of such meddling underscored the alienation and frustration of urban
interests. 51 New York City, as George Plunkitt of Tammany Hall famously
complained, was
a city ruled entirely by the hayseed legislators at Albany. . . . We’ve got to eat
and drink what they tell us to eat and drink, and have got to choose our time
for eatin’ and drinkin’ to suit them. If they don’t feel like takin’ a glass of beer
on Sunday, we must abstain. If they haven’t got any amusements in their
backwoods, we musn’t have none. We’ve got to regulate our whole lives to
52
suit them. And then we have to pay their taxes to boot.

The “deep-rooted evil” of state interference was all the more troubling in New
York and many other settings, because rural-urban tensions were overlaid with
sharp partisan distinctions between urban Democratic machines and “upstate”
Republicans.53 This pattern “placed many of the cities on the plane of captured
provinces,” as one reformer lamented, “to be exploited and bled for the benefit,
not so much of the state itself, as in the interest of a particular political party
which happened to control the legislature.”54
While urban bosses and urban reformers joined ranks against state
interference, they agreed on little else. For the latter, home rule was aimed
simultaneously at meddling state legislatures and corrupt local political
machines.55 The problem, as home rule champion Frank Goodnow put it
succinctly in 1916, was that American cities were “unwisely, inefficiently, and
extravagantly administered.”56 State interference, in his view, was yet another
unfortunate consequence of boss rule, “due very largely to the despair of the
people of our cities of ever obtaining good government through their own
efforts. They have therefore rushed to the legislature for protection.”57 In most
settings, home rule was pursued alongside parallel campaigns for “clean”
government and managerial efficiency, including innovations such as

51. KRANE, RIGOS & HILL, supra note 45, at 11. Such meddling included the “ripper” laws
of the mid-nineteenth century, which displaced local governance with state commissions. The
imposition of a metropolitan police commission on New York City in 1857, for example, sparked
days of rioting. See HOWARD MCBAIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 7
(1916).
52. WILLIAM RIORDAN, PLUNKITT OF TAMMANY HALL 21 (1963).
53. Id.
54. ARDNT, supra note 24, at 221; GOODNOW, supra note 45, at 233; MCBAIN, supra note
51, at 64–101.
55. GOODNOW, supra note 45, at 17.
56. Id. at 2.
57. Id. at 8.
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commission government, unified executive budgets, and merit-based civil
service reform.58
Indeed, viewed in the larger context of Gilded Age and Progressive urban
reform, the home rule movement loses much of its luster. Careful examination
of legislative “interference” suggests that states were actually quite deferential
to urban interests; most special legislation was introduced by urban legislators,
other legislators deferred to sponsors when such bills were referred to
committee, committees routinely reported such bills to the floor where they
were almost always passed, and neither state senates nor governors showed
any inclination to second-guess house action. This was the case even in states,
such as Plunkitt’s New York, that were marked by a partisan split between
urban and rural interests.59
The real object of home rule—like so many other facets of Progressive Era
municipal reform—was simply to undermine the ability of urban bosses to
mobilize or reward supporters.60 The core accomplishment of home rule, after
all, was the ability of cities to charter their own governments, and reformers
left little doubt as to what form that government should take.61 The point of
home rule “is to give the cities of the state an opportunity to adopt what is
termed the commission form of government,” as one contemporary noted, “the
chief excellence of which is the concentration of municipal power into the
hands of a few men or responsible agents, who are usually put at the head of
the several departments necessary to the conduct of the business of cities.”62
Home rule was a precondition less for popular sovereignty than for “business”
management—a sentiment underscored by the collapse of urban political
participation even as home rule and allied reforms promised to emancipate
urban voters.63
The home rule movement was a multifaceted campaign, pursued largely by
academic reformers and “good government” municipal leagues, and was aimed
at a variety of urban ills.64 This, as one reformer summarized the movement,
was
58. Hays, supra note 30, at 157–69.
59. Scott Allard et al., Representing Urban Interests: The Local Politics of State
Legislatures, 12 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 276, 276–94 (1998); Eric Monkkonen, The Politics of
Municipal Indebtedness and Default, 1850-1936, in THE POLITICS OF URBAN FISCAL POLICY
125, 125–53 (Terrence McDonald & Sally Ward eds., 1984).
60. Hays, supra note 30, at 157–69.
61. James Weinstein, Organized Business and the City Commission and Manager
Movements, 28 J. S. HIST. 166, 178 (1962).
62. Barnes v. City of Kirksville, 180 S.W. 545, 548 (1915).
63. Walter Dean Burnham, The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe, 59 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 7, 22 (1965) (discussing a classic account of home rule); see also Hays, supra note
30, at 6–38.
64. Cumfer, supra note 38, at 924–28.
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an effort to make our cities free and relieve them of the necessity of jockeying
at the state capitols for special local legislation, as well as rendering them
immune from legislative attack or interference . . . as well as ridding
themselves of local dictators with power built up by intrigue, chicane, and
political patronage without regard to public justice or a business administration
of municipal affairs. . . . The central thought of the home rule city is that it
shall be governed by men who work, and whose ideals become its soul and
guiding light. Its moving epic is a reincarnation of the spirit of the burghers of
65
Florence; a new renaissance in American municipal life.

Home rulers fought for the city’s status as a “state within a state” in such a way
as to both carve out a clear set of municipal responsibilities and erect barriers
to state interference or preemption.66
The goals and pace of the home rule challenge to Dillon’s Rule varied
widely across the country, and as the movement progressed through the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first, and most common, home
rule victory was a prohibition of state meddling through “special” legislation.67
Most midwestern and western state constitutions adopted after the midnineteenth century included such provisions.68 Such constraints on state power,
however, meant little if they were not accompanied by the devolution of some
political responsibility to the cities themselves.69 The first goal, in this respect,
was local control over the structure and administration of local government, a
right first won in Missouri in 1875, followed by California in 1879,
Washington in 1889, Minnesota in 1896, and a flurry of states in the long
decade before World War I.70 The progress of home rule slowed, in part
because the Supreme Court reaffirmed Dillon’s Rule in 1923, and in part
because the Depression pushed the constitutional question of federal power to
the forefront. Yet eight more states established or elaborated home rule
provisions between the wars,71 a few more states joined the roster after 1945,
and many others expanded earlier laws—dropping population thresholds,

65. WILLIAM K. CLUTE, THE LAW OF MODERN MUNICIPAL CHARTERS 123 (Fred. S. Drake
ed., 1920).
66. Briffault, supra note 45, at 8–9.
67. Jon Teaford, Special Legislation and the Cities, 1865–1900, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 189,
189–212 (1979).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Colorado, Oregon, Oklahoma, Michigan, Arizona, Ohio, Nebraska, Texas, Maryland,
Connecticut, and Massachusetts. Id.
71. Pennsylvania, New York, Nevada, Wisconsin, Utah, Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia. Id.
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enumerating new municipal powers, and extending home rule to counties as
well.72
By the end of the twentieth century, forty-five states allowed some form of
home rule and about thirty states granted substantive structural, political, and
fiscal responsibility to local governments.73 Generally, home rule powers were
most expansive through the West and upper Midwest and weakest in the South
and Northeast.74 The movement never fully succeeded in overthrowing
Dillon’s Rule, and in most states local powers must still be expressly granted
by state law.75 But by the same token, most incorporated municipalities can,
within broad limits set by state law, shape their own charters, enter into
contracts, tax local residents, go into debt, zone and annex land, and provide a
broad range of local services.76
III. THE HIGH PRICE OF HOME RULE IN GREATER ST. LOUIS
In most settings, home rule was pursued and won for an idealized city—a
sort of Florentine or Roman city-state representing a diverse economic and
demographic base, a metropolitan anchor for a larger region, and a “more or
less natural unit of government.”77 But cities changed. As home rule ceded
greater authority to local governments, it also made it possible for fragments of
the metropolis to incorporate their own governments. The result was not just
cities with some autonomy from state rule, but also proliferating suburbs with
autonomy from the central city and from each other.78 While the nation’s
metropolitan areas79 number in the hundreds, there are, by the last Census of
Governments, nearly 39,000 local general-purpose governments and another
51,000 special-purpose governments.80 The modern city represents anything

72. Id. (noting that a few more states joined the roster after 1945, and many others expanded
earlier laws—dropping population thresholds, enumerating new municipal powers, and extending
home rule to counties as well).
73. Schaller, supra note 31, at 402–04.
74. KRANE, RIGOS & HILL, supra note 45, at 10–16.
75. Stephanie Cole, Illinois Home Rule in Historical Perspective, in HOME RULE IN ILLINOIS
11, 11–16 (Stephanie Cole & Samuel K. Grove eds., 1971).
76. MOTT, supra note 41, at 13–27.
77. HOWARD L. MCBAIN, AMERICAN CITY PROGRESS AND THE LAW 1 (Columbia
University Press ed., 1918).
78. See JACKSON, supra note 37 (generally discussing suburban autonomy from state rule);
GORDON, supra note 14, at 39–46 (discussing a St. Louis case).
79. Office of Mgmt. & the Budget, 2010 Standards for Delineating Metropolitan and
Micropolitan Statistical Areas, 75 FED. REG. 37246, 37252 (2010) (defining metropolitan areas as
population centers or economic regions).
80. A general-purpose government, like that of a county or city, takes on a broad array of
governmental responsibilities; a special-purpose government—which often overlaps other
jurisdictions—is usually a taxing authority for a single public good, such as sewers or schools or
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but a “natural unit of government.” Today, metropolitan St. Louis consists of
17 counties, 309 municipalities or census-designated places, and 165 school
districts.81
With the advent of home rule, state and local law regarding incorporation,
annexation, and consolidation varied wildly, but in most settings made it much
easier to incorporate new localities on the city’s fringes. “By the early
twentieth century suburbanites had begun carving up the metropolis,” the
urban historian Jon Teaford concludes, “and the states had handed them the
knife.”82 Nowhere was this truer than in Greater St. Louis.83 St. Louis County
claimed six incorporated municipalities in 1900 and only twelve more by
1930—but that number had more than doubled by 1940 and doubled again by
1950.84 During this era, most new housing stock was erected in unincorporated
subdivisions.85 The character of these suburbs was determined by the terms
and standards of private construction and realty, including house and lot size
and deed restrictions.86 Residents sought incorporation as a means of
sustaining local standards. Professional planners, for their part, routinely
discouraged their St. Louis County clients from annexing new territory.
Instead, they argued that smaller municipal units were sufficient to provide
local services and necessary to avoid the threats posed by mixed density or
use.87 The result, noted as early as the late 1920s, was a “considerable number
of small communities,” each “separate from the metropolitan city and . . . aloof
from its neighbor.”88 It bears repeating: today’s metropolitan St. Louis consists

fire protection. 2012 Census of Governments, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at http://www.cen
sus.gov/govs/cog2012/.
81. KRANE, RIGOS & HILL, supra note 45, at 3; ORFIELD, supra note 5, at 160–63; Tim P.
Fischesser, ST. LOUIS MUN. LEAGUE, http://www.stlmuni.org/; St. Louis County/City School
District Profiles, http://www.hughcalc.org/hugh/stl_schools.html; Jennifer Florida, CITY OF ST.
LOUIS RECORDER OF DEEDS, http://www.stlouiscityrecorder.org/areacounties.html.
82. JON C. TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB: THE POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION OF
METROPOLITAN AMERICA, 1850–1970, at 31 (1979).
83. See GORDON, supra note 14, at 40.
84. In 1900, Bridgeton, Fenton, Ferguson, Florissant, Kirkwood, and Webster Groves; in
1930, these six and Brentwood, Clayton, Glendale, Huntleigh, Maplewood, Oakland, Olivette,
Richmond Heights, Rock Hill, Shrewsbury, University City, and Valley Park. BRADY BAYBECK
& E. TERRENCE JONES, ST. LOUIS METROMORPHOSIS: PAST TRENDS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
277 (2004).
85. See GORDON, supra note 14, at 41.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Elwood Street, Community Organization in Greater St. Louis, 6 SOCIAL FORCES 248,
249 (1927).
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of 17 counties, 309 municipalities or census-designated places, and 165 school
districts.89
It was not, of course, the mere fact of this fragmentation that caused the
damage, but what the proliferation of local governments did with their power.
What has played out in St. Louis, and in many other settings, is an object
lesson in the perils and costs of local power. When a city is governed by a
patchwork of insular corporate units that are uneven in size, capacity, and
composition, the fruits of local growth will accumulate in a small subset of
affluent localities.90 Patterns of economic and racial segregation will harden
over time.91 Civic participation and public good will suffer.92 And all of this
will come at the expense of the greater metropolis, where the aggregate costs
of petty localism vastly outweigh the scattered local benefits.93
First and foremost, home rule nurtured segregation.94 The early twentiethcentury city was a natural unit of diverse and densely interrelated populations
and economic activities, as “bustling streets with a mixture of factories,
offices, apartments and homes crowded together amidst heavy traffic, noise,
dirt, and excitement.”95 By the middle of the twentieth century, these same
cities were defined and shaped by lines of incorporation that separated the
offices and factories from the homes, and the homes from the apartments.96 As
independently incorporated suburbs segregated residential and commercial
development, they increasingly viewed local government not as a means of
managing the city, but as a protector of “hearth and home” against the threats
posed by the city.97
Local segregation was deepened and subsidized by state and federal policy.
During its heyday from the late 1930s through the late 1950s, the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) wedded its mortgage guarantee programs to an
elaborate system of rating prospective borrowers, properties, and
neighborhoods.98 In St. Louis and elsewhere, FHA policies assumed that stable
89. Tim P. Fischesser, ST. LOUIS MUN. LEAGUE, http://www.stlmuni.org/; St. Louis
County/City School District Profiles, http://www.hughcalc.org/hugh/stl_schools.html; Jennifer
Florida, CITY OF ST. LOUIS RECORDER OF DEEDS, http://www.stlouiscityrecorder.org/areacoun
ties.html.
90. Briffault, supra note 45, at 1.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1–2.
93. Id. at 6.
94. Id. at 16.
95. BERNARD FRIEDEN, ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL.,
METROPOLITAN AMERICA: CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM 17 (1966).
96. Id. at 18.
97. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 119–20 (1961).
98. For this history, see Amy Hillier, Searching for Red Lines: Spatial Analysis of Lending
Patterns in Philadelphia, 1940–1960, 72 PA. HIST. 25, 25–47 (2005); Kenneth T. Jackson, Race,
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housing values required that neighborhoods “be occupied by the same racial
and social classes” and pushed investment away from the “crowded
neighborhoods” and “older properties” of the central cities.99
These underwriting standards—which the FHA borrowed whole hog from
the real estate industry—also shaped local control over land zoning.100
Through the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, exclusionary zoning101
was allowed only on the basis of public health, public safety, or public morals.
Courts consistently held that zoning could not be used to sustain property
values or the qualities of certain neighborhoods.102 But as home rule
encouraged fragmented incorporation, states ceded zoning authority to local
governments, and emerging suburbs sought to protect “community standards,”
exclusionary zoning became a much more potent tool.103 Such exclusionary
zoning practices include minimum lot size, minimum dwelling size, and
restrictions on, or outright prohibitions of, manufactured or multifamily
housing.104 These practices were pioneered, in many respects, by the FHA’s
desire to sustain “the character of the community” in early postwar
developments.105
In the St. Louis suburbs, zoning was routinely and candidly viewed as a
mechanism for sorting the metropolitan population by race and income, and for
sustaining the spirit of race-restrictive deed covenants past their expiration.106
The direct examples here are telling. The City of Berkeley in St. Louis County
grew out of a dispute over school district boundaries with neighboring
Kinloch—the lone black enclave in the County.107 When white residents failed
to sustain school segregation by dividing the school district, they created a new
town in 1937 instead.108 The City of Black Jack was hastily formed in 1970 to
Ethnicity, and Real Estate Appraisal: The Home Owners Loan Corporation and the Federal
Housing Administration, J. URB. HIST. 419, 431–32 (1980); Thomas Hanchett, The Other
‘Subsidized Housing’: Federal Aid to Suburbanization, 1940s to 1960s, in FROM TENEMENTS TO
THE TAYLOR HOMES: IN SEARCH OF AN URBAN HOUSING POLICY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY
AMERICA (2000).
99. See GORDON, supra note 14, at 88–98.
100. See ROSE HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS 203
(1969).
101. Exclusionary zoning might include prohibitions against certain kinds of commercial
establishments or restrictions on the size or density of residential buildings. See Henry A. Span,
How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 8 (2001).
102. GORDON, supra note 14, at 66.
103. Id.
104. Briffault, supra note 45, at 21–22.
105. See MCBAIN, supra note 77, at 114; ORFIELD, supra note 5, at 58–59; JACKSON, supra
note 37, at 207.
106. GORDON, supra note 14, at 112–52.
107. Id. at 41.
108. Id. at 41–43.
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stave off a mixed-income housing project.109 The sprawling West County
municipality of Wildwood (incorporated in 1995) was driven largely by fears
that St. Louis County was not willing to sustain large-lot single-family
residential development.110
Segregation and fragmented governance, in turn, created enduring fiscal
dilemmas. Cities lost the taxing power to match their responsibilities, while
suburbs were able to build a lucrative tax base while evading many of those
responsibilities.111 Central cities have always borne a disproportionate share of
broad “metropolitan” services—such as airports, libraries, zoos, museums,
parks, or hospitals—while suburban localities provide a more modest range of
services on a much more stable tax base.112 At the same time, suburbs are able
to duck many of the costs of suburbanization itself.113 Some of the slack is
picked up by the state or counties, but often in such a way as to place even
greater tax burdens on inner city residents.114 Perhaps most importantly, home
rule, along with its fragmented tax base, tends to cement or exaggerate
interlocal differences in wealth and tax-funded services—especially public
education.115 While a rash of “equal protection” lawsuits have compelled states
to step in and even out some of this disparity, home rule—and its
consequences for poorer students—remains the organizing principle of school
governance and finance.116 Indeed courts have generally held that local control
over school finance is a logical corollary to the broader assumption that local
government is an extension of parental control and familial interests.117
Historically, such fiscal challenges are only exacerbated by efforts to
overcome them through urban renewal or local economic development
policies.118 Despite the attention paid to corporate trophy hunting at the state
level, the practice of offering lucrative tax incentives or subsidies to

109. Id.
110. Id. at 43.
111. For the dynamics and patterns of this fiscal inequity, see ORFIELD, supra note 5, at 49–
64.
112. Thomas R. Dye & John A. Garcia, Structure, Function, and Policy in American Cities,
40 URB. AFF. REV. 103, 106–08 (1978).
113. Some of these costs include highway development, mass transit, policing, storm
drainage, and emergency services. See ROBERT W. BURCHELL ET AL., TRANSP. RESEARCH BD.,
TCRP REPORT 39: THE COSTS OF SPRAWL—REVISITED 26 (1998), available at http://onlinepubs.
trb.org/onlinepubs/tcrp/tcrp_rpt_39-a.pdf.
114. See generally Margaret Weir et al., The Calculus of Coalitions: Cities, Suburbs, and the
Metropolitan Agenda, 40 URB. AFF. REV. 730, 730–60 (2005).
115. Briffault, supra note 45, at 21.
116. See id. at 24–39.
117. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1989); Briffault,
supra note 45, at 24.
118. See GORDON, supra note 14, at 188–220.
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prospective investors is largely a local phenomenon.119 Indeed the vast
majority of such subsidized relocations occur not across state lines but within a
state or metropolitan region.120 Municipalities, often drawing on the same pot
of state money for “community development,” compete frantically for
commercial investment.121 Local governments are, by nature, more susceptible
to the influence of powerful corporate interests.122 These corporate interests
routinely pit communities against one and other, making cities less likely to
consider the broader regional impact of business relocation.123 The result, now
widely documented, is a largely irrational scramble for business investment.124
In their eagerness to pad the tax base for the long run, local governments will
defer tax collection or target tax expenditures for the short run—often ten or
twenty or thirty years.125 In their eagerness to cut a better deal than competing
cities, local governments will avoid attaching strings, such as wage or job
retention guarantees, to development assistance unless local or state law
compels them to do so.126 Cities routinely forgo tax collections or pay
subsidies that buy little more than “business confidence.”127
In St. Louis, this local competition is exaggerated by the stakes—Missouri
municipalities can choose to keep sales taxes generated locally128—and by the
stark underlying geography of local inequality. Fragmented local governance
has meant, among other things, that economic change will be borne unequally.
Deindustrialization, automobility, and the emergence of a service and
knowledge economy brought with them winners and losers. In St. Louis, of
course, the old economy lay mostly to the east of Skinker Boulevard, and the

119. Rebuilding Communities, THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS MO., https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/gov
ernment/departments/sldc/economic-development/financing/rebuildcomms.cfm (last visited Feb.
2, 2015).
120. Id.
121. See GREG LEROY ET AL., ANOTHER WAY SPRAWL HAPPENS: ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES IN A TWIN CITIES SUBURB (1999), available at http://www.goodjobs
first.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/anoka.pdf.
122. See Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, Or, Can Public Choice
Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 996–97 (1991).
123. See id. at 96.
124. See, e.g., PETER K. EISINGER, THE RISE OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: STATE AND
LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 139 (1988).
125. See GREG LEROY, THE GREAT AMERICAN JOBS SCAM: CORPORATE TAX DODGING AND
THE MYTH OF JOB CREATION 17, 191 (2005).
126. PETER FISHER & ALAN PETERS, INDUSTRIAL INCENTIVES: COMPETITION AMONG
AMERICAN STATES AND CITIES 40 (1998).
127. See EISINGER, supra note 124, at 139.
128. See GORDON, supra note 14, at 66.
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new economy mostly to the west.129 Urban renewal and economic development
policies, in this context, tended to harden local segregation, erode fiscal
capacity where it is needed most, and widen the gap between the City of St.
Louis and its suburbs.130
IV. UNDOING THE DAMAGE?
Urban historians and urban scholars generally agree that patchwork
governance has been disastrous for American cities.131 Home rule has
encouraged local piracy, cemented local inequalities, and frustrated any
broader or regional response. Local interests grasped this as well.132 The ink
was scarcely dry on the 1876 accord splitting the City and the County when the
former discovered that it would bear most of the costs and reap little of the
benefit of home rule.133 And even the County, while unwilling to reconsider its
divorce from the City, struggled with the costs and confusion of municipal
proliferation within its borders.134 Fair housing advocates identified municipal
fragmentation—and the policies that flowed from it—as an engine of local
segregation.135 And business interests and groups came to realize that
fragmented policy and planning turned growth politics into a local game of
musical chairs.136 For these reasons, the region has monotonously, although
never successfully, revisited the question of stitching the City and the County
back together again.137 In the early 1920s, in the wake of Progressive Era
fascination with “business-minded” managerial efficiency in local government,
a board of freeholders138 laid out a range of options for regional

129. See generally Bruce Katz, Policy Brief # 33 Reviving Cities: Think Metropolitan, in
BROOKINGS POLICY BRIEF SERIES (1998), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/pa
pers/1998/06/metropolitanpolicy-katz.
130. See generally GORDON, supra note 14, at 188–213.
131. Id. at 46; see generally Katz, supra note 129.
132. GORDON, supra note 14, at 46.
133. See id. at 40–41, 46.
134. Id. at 46.
135. See generally id. at 96–97.
136. Id. at 46.
137. Id.
138. GORDON, supra note 14, at 46. In 1924, Article VI, Local Government, Section 30(a)
was added to the Missouri Constitution specifying the procedure for considering the consolidation
of St. Louis City and St. Louis County. Any plan to consolidate, extend boundaries, or to
establish metropolitan districts which crossed the City-County line would be drawn up by a
specially appointed board of freeholders, made up of eight landowners from the County, eight
from the City, and one from another county. MO. CONST. art. VI, § 30(a). In 1990, the Missouri
Supreme Court struck down the landholding requirement on equal protection grounds and
required only that members be “electors” (eligible voters). Millsap v. Quinn, 785 S.W.2d 82, 83–
85 (Mo. 1990).
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consolidation—including a return of St. Louis City to St. Louis County,
annexation of part of the County by the City, annexation of the entire County
by the City, and establishment of “special districts” for certain metropolitan
services.139 County opposition torpedoed the proposal, and reformers led by
the chamber of commerce regrouped around a “federal” plan that would
maintain existing municipalities but create a new regional government with
responsibility for health, sewers, public utilities, libraries, parks, and city
planning.140 This option was defeated in a statewide vote in 1930.141
After 1930, the federal or regional option proceeded in fits and starts,
yielding the creation of the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, which
encompassed the City and the Missouri suburbs in the Mississippi watershed,
in 1954, a junior college district in 1962, and a zoo-museum district in 1971.142
Despite a near consensus that transportation (public and highways) posed the
greatest regional planning challenge, the idea of a special transit district stalled,
leaving only the Bi-State Development Agency, a combination planning body
and bridge/harbor authority without any taxing power.143 The chamber of
commerce and others continued to promote some form of regional government
and underwrote an exhaustive “Metropolitan St. Louis Survey” in 1955, which
suggested a new metropolitan government with responsibility for arterial
roads, transit, planning, economic development, sewers, civil defense, police,
and property assessment.144
Again, regional solutions could not run the gauntlet of the joint St. Louis
City-County Board of Freeholders, which split fairly predictably along CityCounty lines and settled on a weak compromise.145 This pleased no one.
County interests remained leery of any threat to home rule. City interests saw
little benefit in half measures.146 African Americans on the City’s north side
feared losing what little clout they claimed. Not surprisingly, the plan was
easily defeated in a 1959 special election, losing by a margin of 2–1 in the City
and 3–1 in the County.147

139. GORDON, supra note 14, at 46.
140. Id.
141. Id.; see also JONES, supra note 1, at 62–70.
142. GORDON, supra note 14, at 46–47.
143. Id. at 47.
144. Study of St. Louis Metropolitan Area (1955) (on file with the St. Louis League of
Women Voters Records, Box 18:98 (sl530), the Western Historical Manuscript Collection at the
University of Missouri–St. Louis)
145. HENRY SCHMANDT ET AL., METROPOLITAN REFORM IN ST. LOUIS 5–15 (1961).
146. See JONES, supra note 1, at 76.
147. SCHMANDT ET AL, supra note 145, at 24–25, 37.
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This brings us back to the 1962 “Borough Plan,” the last serious stab at
overcoming regional fragmentation and its ills.148 Like previous efforts, the
Borough Plan proposed a sort of federal solution: an umbrella regional
government assuming most core metropolitan responsibilities and twenty-two
local boroughs, which would provide local representation and a shadow of
home rule.149 Proponents once again voiced their disdain for the region’s
“hodge-podge of feeble, self-centered, conflicting governments” and the
“crazy-quilt of extravagant burdening and unneeded tax bodies.”150 Critics,
especially in the County’s suburbs and in the City’s African American wards,
countered that the Borough Plan was being “forced down the throats of the
people of St. Louis and St. Louis County” and that it was all little more than “a
clever attempt to delude the people of the area, particularly those in St. Louis
County, into believing that their local communities will actually remain in
existence.”151 The proposal lost handily, by a near 4–1 margin, in the statewide
vote.152
After 1962, the “beggar-thy-neighbor” logic of home rule and the urgency
of regional solutions persisted, but serious political reforms were rarely
broached. Local governments toyed with a regional council.153 Local growth
interests, most prominently Civic Progress and the City and County chambers
of commerce (merged and recast as the St. Louis Regional Chamber and
Growth Association in 1973), continued to lament the costs and inefficiencies
of local fragmentation.154 But, as Civic Progress concluded glumly in 1969, the
combined opposition of suburban interests and the City’s African American
wards left “little or no chance of major governmental consolidation.”155 Even
148. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
149. Some Facts About the Borough Plan (Apr. 1962) (on file with the St. Louis League of
Women Voters Records, Folder 1163 (sl530), the Western Historical Manuscript Collection at the
University of Missouri–St. Louis).
150. For a Single, Effective, Economical Government (1962) (on file with the St. Louis
League of Women Voters Records, Box 6:69 (s557), the Western Historical Manuscript
Collection at the University of Missouri–St. Louis).
151. William Human, Analysis of the Borough Plan (1961) (on file with the St. Louis League
of Women Voters Records, Box 18:100 (sl234), the Western Historical Manuscript Collection at
the University of Missouri–St. Louis).
152. See JONES, supra note 1, at 79-82.
153. One draft idea was the St. Louis Council of Governments (SLACOG) envisioned as “an
umbrella organization with a policy board to which a variety of functional planning and
management units could be responsible.” See Phoenix Fund, SLACOG: An Analysis (1974) (on
file with the St. Louis League of Women Voters Records, Folder 1179 (sl530), the Western
Historical Manuscript Collection at the University of Missouri–St. Louis).
154. Merger of a Metropolis (1967) (on file with the St. Louis League of Women Voters
Records, Box 7:150 (sl234), the Western Historical Manuscript Collection at the University of
Missouri–St. Louis).
155. LANA STEIN, ST. LOUIS POLITICS: THE TRIUMPH OF TRADITION 147 (2002).
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St. Louis County, fearing that municipal incorporation and annexations would
leave it with little but substandard housing, farms, and floodplains on its tax
rolls, floated a number of proposals for municipal reorganization and new
County authority over land use and zoning.156 The County, however, could not
overcome the entrenched defense of fragmented home rule.157
The regional perspective was, and is, sustained by organizations like the
East-West Gateway Coordinating Council (now the East-West Gateway
Council of Governments),158 Confluence (now FOCUS) St. Louis, and the
Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing Opportunity Council.159 But the
willingness and ability of these organizations to document the consequences of
political fragmentation were not matched by their capacity to implement
lasting solutions. The actual governance of the metropolis, claimed fleetingly
by the City of St. Louis in 1876, remains largely in the hands of hundreds of
suburban corporate fragments, most of which exist and legislate in order to
keep the City, its problems, and its costs at bay.
V. CONCLUSION
There is a stark and sustained mismatch between the natural economic and
demographic scope of American cities, and the crazy quilt of governments that
furnish public goods and public services to their residents. Such governmental
fragmentation is suspect on efficiency grounds alone, as local services—and
the means to pay for them—are replicated in incorporated units that are, in
scope and timing, largely accidents of local development patterns and policies.
More importantly, patchwork governance cements and sustains local
inequalities in such a way that local services—and the means to pay for
them—vary dramatically across the metropolitan region. These political units,
numbering in the hundreds in many settings, have distinct economic and
demographic profiles, and dramatically uneven economic assets and fiscal
capacities. Those that come out ahead in all of this, or hope to, pursue policies
that harden such inequalities. Those that fall behind—especially the older,
central cities—can do little but watch.
In St. Louis, this local fragmentation played out in a particularly damaging
fashion. As an older industrial river city, St. Louis lacked the economic growth
or diversity of many of its peers. Deindustrialization hit hard and early, and the

156. GORDON, supra note 14, at 49.
157. City-County Matters (1969) (on file with the St. Louis League of Women Voters
Records, Box 1:16 (sl234), the Western Historical Manuscript Collection at the University of
Missouri–St. Louis).
158. JONES, supra note 1, at 148–50.
159. FOCUS ST. LOUIS, TOO MANY GOVERNMENTS? A REPORT ON GOVERNMENT
STRUCTURE IN ST. LOUIS CITY AND COUNTY (1987).
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losers outnumbered the winners. As a border city, St. Louis was also a starkly
racial setting, its development marked by a sustained and elaborate pattern of
local segregation by private and public means. And as a Missouri city, St.
Louis faced few legal or regulatory constraints on sprawl. All of this meant
that local factions had both the incentive and the ability to engage in over a
century of intense and unequal competition to hoard the region’s assets and
avoid its liabilities.
The recognition that this political fragmentation was destructive came
early to St. Louis planners and politicians, as even the urban champions of the
1876 accord splitting St. Louis and St. Louis County soon claimed buyer’s
remorse. But successive stabs at reform, each more urgent than the last, have
hardly left a mark. Truly metropolitan or regional solutions remained elusive.
In part, this is because our cities and municipalities are political
afterthoughts—their power of home rule reluctantly ceded by state legislatures.
They have just enough local discretion over land use and planning to beggar
their neighbors, but not means or incentive to cooperate with them. And in part
this is because, as the region’s problems worsened and spilled from the central
city into the inner suburbs, the stakes just got higher. Regional cooperation
became more urgent and yet more elusive with each passing decade.

